Questions regarding scientific content and contributions should be directed to the organizers.
Throughout the historical development of their discipline, sociologists have borrowed models of social change from other academic fields.
In the late 19th century, when evolution became the predominant model for understanding biological change, ideas of social change took on an evolutionary cast, and, though other models have refined modern notions of social change, evolution persists as an underlying principle.
Considering their irreplaceable role as a mechanism for resolving conflicts in both private and public life, the relative neglect of the notion of compromise in philosophy, political science, and sociology is astonishing.
The Zi F conference aimed to (partly) fill this gap and to help understand the notion of compromise.
With regard to the third topic, it has been argued that compromises are morally bad if they break an absolute rule of conduct, if they prefer a lesser instance of a single good to a greater one, and if they prefer an inferior to a superior good.
Sylvia Agbih (Bielefeld, GER), Kai Augustini (Bielefeld, GER), Nigel Biggar (Oxford, GBR), Rdiger Bittner (Bielefeld, GER), Luca Costa (Genua, ITA), Alexandra Dewar (London, GBR), Silvia Donzelli (Berlin, GER), Daniel Friedrich (Mnster, GER), Jonas Geske (Bielefeld, GER), David Gilgen (Bielefeld, GER), John Horton (Staffordshire, GBR), Benjamin Huppert (Dsseldorf, GER), Alexandra Koch (Bielefeld, GER), Martin Leiner (Jena, GER), Adrew Lister (Kingston, CAN), Avishai Margalit (Jerusalem, ISR), Reinhard Merkel (Hamburg, GER), Katrin Neuheuser (Bielefeld, GER), Tim Niklas Nissel (Bielefeld, GER), Christian Rostbll (Kopenhagen, DEN), lise Roumas (Oxford, GBR), Stephan Schlothfeld (Bielefeld, GER), Dennis Schmidt (Bielefeld, GER), Steven Wall (Tucson, USA), Daniel Weinstock (Montreal, CAN), Manon Westphal (Mnster, GER), Joachim Wndisch (Dsseldorf, GER) Please direct questions concerning the organisation of the workshop to Marina Hoffmann at the Conference Office.The connection between anticipation and conflicts has been well known since the early days of conflict studies.In fact, the difference between defensive and aggressive conflicts is often articulated in terms of anticipations, as shown by the way in which the basic types of conflicts are usually defined: Furthermore, it is often assumed that power is a scarce resource, i.e. If power is indeed a scarce resource, the obvious consequence is that contendants will try anything to have more of it (I will consider in a future post the alternative view that power may not be a scarse resource).With regard to the first topic, it seems clear that significant inequalities of power can thwart the opening of joint attempts to settle conflicts through compromise and undermine fair concession making in the process of compromising.This consideration links to the second, the question of fairness of compromises.Much more is there, however: for systems which are able to anticipate behave in a much more sophisticated way than systems without such a capacity.